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Abstract
This study seeks to understand the competitive pattern and strategy of the firms in 
the Brazilian automobile financing market. First, we analyzed the strong segmentation 
observed in this market, determining market niches. We then estimated reaction func-
tions to price changes. The results indicated that the three largest companies in the 
sector have a strong influence on interest rate setting within the entire segment. This 
phenomenon characterizes the competition of this sector as the leader-follower type, 
rather than Bertrand competition, the latter of which is often expected in the banking 
sector and it demonstrates the existence of the leading firms’ market power.
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Resumo
Este estudo busca compreender o padrão competitivo e estratégia das empresas no 
mercado de financiamento de automóveis brasileiro. Primeiramente, analisamos a forte 
segmentação observada neste mercado, determinando nichos de mercado. Em seguida, 
estimamos funções de reação às mudanças de preços dos concorrentes. Os resultados 
indicam que as três maiores empresas do setor têm uma forte influência sobre a definição 
da taxa de juros dentro de todo o segmento. Esse fenômeno caracteriza a competição 
do setor como do tipo líder-seguidor, ao invés de competição a la Bertrand, o último 
dos quais é frequentemente esperado no setor bancário e demonstra a existência de 
poder de mercado das empresas  líderes.
Palavras-Chave
funções de reação, financiamento de automóveis, competição líder-seguidor, poder 
de mercado
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1. Introduction
Credit markets are important for many of reasons. At a macro level, 
it channels savings to consumption and investment. At a micro level, 
it relaxes personal financial constraints and finances the investment 
of firms. They are also very important to the proper functioning of 
some markets, such as real state, automobiles etc. It is straightfor-
ward to claim that the efficiency of the credit markets affects the 
efficiency of other sectors in the economy, if not the economy as 
a whole. Market failures, such as the exercise of market power or 
missing markets, can be very detrimental to efficiency and welfare. 
At the same time, banking systems of many countries are characteri-
zed by being concentrated. For example, using a list of 25 countries 
of the European Union, Allen et al. (2006) find that the average 
share of the five largest credit institutions in terms of total assets is 
59%, with countries such as Belgium, Netherlands and Finland being 
well over 80%. 
Although concentration does not mean market power, economic 
theory usually predicts a positive relationship between the two 
concepts. Concentration in the banking system may lead to market 
power, and be a source of concerns to antitrust authorities. The 
Brazilian banking system is characterized as a large and concentra-
ted market, and has been the subject of much debate about market 
power exercise by the leading banks. 
This paper analyzes competition and market power in the Brazilian 
automobile financing loan market.  We use average weekly loan rates 
per institution to analyze the loan market. The study is divided in 
two parts. First, we performed a descriptive data and market analy-
sis. We showed that it is possible to observe groups of firms with 
similar market positions and thus identify market niches. Second, 
once we define the market segmentation, we derive and estimate 
price reaction functions for the firms in each market niche (intra-
niche) and between different niches.
We find that this market naturally segments into four segments: lar-
ge (or leaders), high-risk, automakers and financers. The large firms 
– Itaú-Unibanco, Bradesco, BV Financeira and Santander – command 
approximately 70% of the market. High-risk firms charge higher 
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rates in serving customers with high credit risk. Automakers are fi-
nancial institutions that are owned by the automaker companies and 
are characterized by lower rate offerings. Financers are firms that do 
not fit into any of the categories described above.
The reaction function estimates show evidence that the three largest 
firms – Bradesco, Itaú-Unibanco and BV Financeira – have a strong 
influence on interest rates within the entire market. Among the 
large firms, Bradesco exerts price leadership. This result has two 
important implications. The first is evidence of a leader-follower 
competitive structure within a strong market segmentation. This 
finding stands in sharp contrast to the Bertrand-type competition 
with homogeneous goods expected to be found in the banking indus-
try. A market competing a la Bertrand converges to an equilibrium 
similar to that of perfect competition. It does not appear to be the 
case in this sector. Segmentation reduces the number of firms that 
are actually close competing, and the existence of leading firms may 
further reduce competition.
The second implication is evidence that market power exists in this 
sector. The results show that most financial institutions react to 
rate changes made by the leading banks, representing evidence of 
the market power of these banks. This study is not suited for the 
analysis of the existence of collusion in this sector. However, the 
results indicate that there is potential for this type of action, which 
justifies the need for special attention from antitrust authorities in 
this segment.
The Brazilian automotive market has grown 42% between 2007 and 
2011.1 This growth was largely driven by a significant increase in the 
credit supply for auto financing, which has grown from 19 billion 
dollars in 2004 to 93 billion dollars in 2010. This growth represents 
an increase of over 400%.2 The strong expansion in the credit supply 
occurred through a system of over 70 institutions that finance this 
type of credit.
1 Source: Central Bank of Brazil (Banco Central do Brasil) – www.bcb.gov.br.
2 Source: National Association of Automaker Financing Companies (Associação Nacional das 
Empresas Financeiras das Montadoras – Anef).
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The automotive sector is constantly targeted by economic stimulus 
policies from the government. This focus is at least partly due to 
the size of the auto industry and the high multiplier impact that the 
industry has in other sectors of the Brazilian economy. The success 
of these policies and the growth of the automotive sector largely 
depend on the functioning of the credit system. Therefore, the effi-
ciency of this market and the competitive pattern of its firms have a 
central role in the success of these policies as well as in the perfor-
mance of the automotive sector as a whole.
Despite the significant number of institutions granting this type of 
credit line, the market is actually highly concentrated. Moreover, the 
competitive environment of the banking and credit sector in Brazil 
is constantly questioned. There are several papers that attempt to 
measure the degree of competition in the sector. Nakane (2002) 
and Belaisch (2003), among others, have analyzed competition in 
the banking credit sector.3 In addition, high banking spreads have 
recently been strongly questioned by the federal government. The 
finding that drops in the basic interest rate (SELIC) do not translate 
to drops in the interest rates charged by the banks has also drawn 
questioning.
In this context of questioning of the competition level of the 
Brazilian credit market, the present study attempts to analyze the 
pattern of competition in the segment of car purchase loans.
We note that none of the studies about market power in the 
Brazilian banking system use reaction-function to identify mar-
ket power. In fact, few studies apply this methodology, with Liang 
(1989) being the only exception we are aware of. Liang uses reaction 
function to recover a conjectural variation parameter. We take a 
different approach: we estimate the reaction-functions and analyze 
the firm’s behavior based influence one firm’s strategy has on the 
other firms.
This study is divided into six parts. The next section provides a brief 
review of the literature, focusing on models of price competition, 
bank competition and reaction function models. Next is the data 
analysis, which features an exploration of the Brazilian banking mar-
ket and a preliminary analysis of the interest rates charged by banks 
3  Both find evidence of moderate or low market power.
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in auto financing. In the following section, a proposal is developed to 
formulate reactions to competitors. Following a deeper data analy-
sis, a market segmentation is suggested, and the reactions to pricing 
variations in each segment are discussed. The sixth and last section 
concludes the paper.
2.  Literature
There is a large literature that analyzes market power in the ban-
king system. Claessens and Laeven (2004) measure market power in 
50 countries’ banking systems.  Their main finding is that banking 
system concentration does not explain market power. On the other 
hand, the threat of entry and market contestability improves market 
competition. 
Allen et al. (2006) analyze the financial system of 25 countries of 
the EU. They find substantial concentration, with higher concentra-
tion among non-OECD countries. 
A study by Osawa (2008) analyzes the behavior of several customers 
when financing a vehicle. The study assumes that consumers do 
not care about the interest rates charged as long as the installment 
amount fits into the family budget. If the premise is validated, pro-
duct pricing (interest rate) will be less important than the financing 
term (which, when lengthened, decreases the installment amount). 
The study finds a demand elasticity of -0.45. Therefore, against 
popular belief, when seeking auto financing, customers evaluate the 
interest rate that is being offered to them.
According to Nagle (1984), the presence of fewer competitors in a 
given segment leads to less elasticity; that is, the number of com-
petitors in the market directly affects pricing. In this market, it is 
common among customers seeking financing to have two or three 
potential financial institutions with which to make a deal. In short, 
the author concludes that we are facing a market in which customers 
care about price, and there is often the presence of competitors. In 
this scenario, reactions to competitors’ price changes play an impor-
tant role in the pricing strategy of the companies in this sector. 
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Nakane (2002) tests the market power of Brazilian banks, using the 
methodology developed by Bresnaham (1982) and Lau (1982). He 
applies this methodology to the loan market. The result indicates 
the existence of a competitive market, with the cartel hypothesis 
being discarded. 
Belaisch (2003) developed another study on competition in the 
Brazilian banking market. The author concludes that the Brazilian 
banking market behaves as an oligopoly, especially due to the lack of 
incentive toward market efficiency. Therefore, the banking spread 
(the difference between the credit-granting interest rate and the 
capital cost) increases, discouraging increases in lending and capi-
talization. A further study conducted by Petterini and Jorge Neto 
(2003) concludes that the Bertrand oligopoly model is the market 
solution that most closely resembles the banking market in Brazil. 
According to Ferreira (2005), locations with several bank branches 
and high economic activity have a relatively higher volume of credit 
and pay lower interest rates. In contrast, regions served by fewer 
banks, where competition is weaker, feature higher rates. Ferreira 
(2005) also finds that regions where the demand is lower do not in-
volve a large number of banks, as the potential profits are not enough 
to cover the costs. In this competitive market, profit evidently arises 
from differentiation strategies.
Several papers use reaction functions estimates to analyze market 
power and firm’s strategies. Liang (1989) estimates price conjectural 
variations in the ready-to-eat breakfast cereal market to measure the 
degree of price competition in a differentiated product oligopoly. 
The empirical concludes that there is collusive behavior.
In the marketing literature, Lazzarini et al. (2007) study competi-
tion among insurance companies. They estimate reaction functions 
and conclude that pricing strategies are very different across firms. 
Brueckner and Luo (2013) estimate reaction functions for the airline 
market where firms compete in frequency of flights in a route. The 
authors argue that flight frequency is the main quality attribute in 
this market. They find a positive relationship between the flight 
frequency of competing firms.
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Dhar et al. (2005) study the strategic pricing of Coca Cola and 
Pepsico leading brands products. The paper adopts a structural 
approach with estimation of demand and pricing equations. No su-
pport is found for Bertrand or Stackelberg type of competition.
Vickner & Davies (1999) makes an empirical investigation about the 
market power and the pricing conduct in a representative product 
differentiated oligopoly: the spaghetti sauce market. It makes use 
of panel data to understand the price conduct and market power of 
firms. It concludes that a portion of the market power of the firms 
is derived from tacit price collusion.
Cotteril (2000) tries to understand the competitive interaction bet-
ween private labels and national brands in the retail food industry. 
According to the authors before trying to understanding the nature 
of the competitive interaction between these two types of brands, it 
is necessary to understand both demand and strategic price setting 
behavior by the firms. This paper expands previous work by using 
a structural system of equations allowing both demand parameters 
and simultaneous estimation of competitive interaction. 
3. Data 
Data from the Central Bank of Brazil show that as of October 2011, 
over 130 financial institutions were approved to conduct bank clea-
ring operations in the country. The magnitude of the banking seg-
ment is routinely measured by the sum of assets of all financial 
institutions. We note in Table 1 the evolution of banking assets in 
Brazil: in December 2007, assets totaled R$2,519 billion, reaching 
R$4,271 billion in December 2010. An increase of approximately 
70% is observed in this period. 
Table 1 - Evolution of banking assets in Brazil
R$ Billion
2007 2008 2009 2010
Dec Dec Dec Dec
Assets 2,519.16 3,353.63 3,571.16 4,271.03
Annual Var. 33% 6% 20%
Source: Central Bank of Brazil.
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Among 2.1 trillion dollars of assets in loans in 2010, R$185 billion 
(approximately 4% of the total) represent loans for auto financing for 
individuals, the focus of this work. As observed in Table 2, this mar-
ket shows steady growth from net financed assets of R$111 billion 
in 2007 to R$185 billion in 2010, representing growth of over 66%. 
Table 2 - Evolution of the net assets of auto financing for individuals
 2007 2008 2009 2010
Net assets (R$ billion) 111 139 157 185
Annual change  25% 13% 18%
Share of total assets 4% 4% 4% 4%
                
Source: ANEF.
On the whole, the auto financing market has the same structure 
as the banking sector: a high number of competitors but high mar-
ket concentration. Figure 1 shows that between 2008 and 2010, 
four institutions alone accounted for approximately 85% of all fi-
nanced assets. Specifically, in 2010, Itaú Bank accounted for 32% of 
all loans destined for individuals for the acquisition of automobiles, 
BV Financeira (auto financing branch of Votorantim Bank) had a 
22% share, and Bradesco and Santander had shares of 18% and 14%, 
respectively.
Figure 1 - Evolution of bank shares in assets of auto financing 
Source: Central Bank of Brazil and bank websites.
To evaluate the price relationships, interest rates were collected 
from the Central Bank of Brazil’s website (www.bcb.gov.br) for 
the acquisition of automobiles from 33 financial institutions from 
January 19, 2009 to August 04, 2011. The data are presented as 
daily measurements (except for weekends and bank holidays) in a 
panel structure; thus, there are 624 interest rate observations for 
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each institution. As clarified by the Central Bank, “interest rates 
disclosed represent the total operation cost for the customer, also 
including fiscal and operational taxes. These rates correspond to the 
average charged rates in the period indicated in the tables”; that is, 
each institution operating in this segment reports the arithmetic rate 
average from all transactions performed on that day. The Special 
Clearance and Escrow System (Sistema Especial de Liquidação e 
Custódia; SELIC) rate was also collected from this website for the 
period in question.
In Figure 2, it is possible to evaluate the average behavior of all con-
solidated institutions. As we can see, for the period under review, 
the average rates fluctuate primarily between 1.5% and 2.5% per 
month.
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Figure 2- Evolution of the average market rate (per month %)
Source: Central Bank of Brazil.
4. Model
The following analysis is similar to the one developed  by Lazzarini 
et al. (2007), who use a market model of differentiated goods fea-
turing price competition. The demand for firm i’s product is given 
by the following equation:
         (1)
Estud. Econ., São Paulo, vol.44, n.3, p.527-552, jul.-set. 2014
536                                                             Rodrigo M.S. Moita e Daniel B. M. Silva
Therefore, the quantity demanded for firm i’s product is negatively 
related to its price (p i ) and directly related to the competitor’s pri-
ce (p j ). Assuming a cost structure with constant marginal cost and 
fixed cost, we have the following profit equation:
( (           (2)
where:
ci= variable cost of firm i
Fi= fixed cost of firm i
Because the firm seeks to maximize profits, the best answer is given 
by the first-order condition—namely,
              (3)
where
                                    (4)
Therefore, the reaction function of firm i tells us that its price is a 
function of its marginal cost and competitor prices. In the specific 
case of auto financing, we approximate the marginal cost by the 
basic interest rate (SELIC), which is the main cost of funding for a 
bank (see Koyama and Nakane, 2002). Therefore,  of the equation 
is separated in two parts as follows:
  and , where                           (5)
 
Note that we are only able to determine the  values in our estima-
tion and that, without more assumptions, it is not possible to iden-
tify the original demand parameters (’s).
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To solve the general problem, it is necessary to develop a system of 
equations for n market competitors, in which each company seeks to 
optimize its price as a function of the competitors’ prices. However, 
in practical terms, we rarely know the competitors’ prices simulta-
neously. According to Fudenberg and Levini (1999) and Lazzarini et 
al. (2007), one way to obtain this equilibrium is to observe previous 
prices set by the competitor. 
With this information, the following dynamic reaction curve is 
found: 
             (6)
where  denotes the price of firm i in time t,   is the lagged 
price of firm i,  denotes competitors’ lagged prices, and   de-
notes the SELIC rate prevailing in the period. The betas () are the 
coefficients of each variable to be estimated. So, the question now 
is: what can we say about the market competition with the reaction 
function estimates? Simply put, the model can identify between a 
perfect competitive environment, oligopolistic competition – price 
leadership and non-leadership - and other competitive environments. 
It is all based on the solely observation of price reactions and mar-
ginal cost. 
In a perfect competitive environment, the coefficients of the compe-
titors’ prices should be zero, since the pricing strategies of the other 
firms should have no influence, and a firm’s own pricing should 
depend solely on marginal cost (SELIC).
There is market power when the competitors’ coefficients matter. 
In this case, firms are indeed pricing strategically in an oligopolistic 
type of competition, and we can distinguish between two situations: 
price leadership versus no leadership. No leadership means that fir-
ms have a similar degree of market power. For any two banks, i and 
j, it implies that the coefficient of bank j is statistically different 
from zero in bank’s i equation and vice versa. We consider this case 
as a competitive oligopoly a la Bertrand. For the price leadership 
case, suppose institution i is the leader and j is the follower. Then, 
the price coefficient of firm i is relevant for firm j pricing strategy, 
but firm j has no influence on firm i pricing strategy. It can have two 
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interpretations, which we cannot distinguish between them. It can 
be a competitive oligopoly with a price leader, or it can be a cartel 
following a pricing rule based on some institution pricing decision. 
Since we cannot rule out between these two situations, price leader-
ship means that some institution is setting the market price, but it 
can happen in a very distinct competitive environment. 
5. Market Segmentation
Once the modeling is defined, the data are analyzed in greater 
depth. Examining the average prices for each institution in the pe-
riod of analysis and classifying them from the highest rate to the 
lowest, we have the results shown in Figure 3.
Figure 3 - Average rate and Boxplot of financial institution rates
Source: Central Bank of Brazil and analyzes.
The right side of Figure 3 shows the average rate per month prac-
ticed by each institution, whereas the left side of the figure shows 
the boxplot of the rates charged by the institution. The average rate 
overall in the period under analysis was 2.06%. Cifra S.A. Bank 
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charged the highest rate (4.11%), and BMW Financeira S.A. charged 
the lowest average rate (1.11%). These extremes illustrate the wide 
range of market prices. The automakers’ banks, which are institu-
tions that are part of the same financial group as the company that 
manufactures the vehicles, work with average rates that are lower 
than the market averages. Examples include BMW, Mercedes-Benz, 
Toyota, PSA Finance (Peugeot), Honda and GMAC (Chevrolet). At 
the top of the chart, we note the presence of high-risk financers: 
(Cifra, Omni, Daycoval, Pecunia), companies that finance vehicles 
for borrowers who present a higher probability of default and that 
thus charge rates higher than the market average (for more details, 
see Koyana, 2002). 
The left side of Figure 3 shows the boxplot of the institution rates. 
We observe that some banks have higher rates of dispersion. These 
banks showed greater rate variance in the period under review. It is 
interesting to note that the high deviation concentration is found in 
the extremes of the graph, that is, in the companies charging avera-
ge rates that are lower than the market average (automaker banks) 
and those that are charging average rates above the market average 
(high-risk financers). 
In the case of automaker banks, the high variance may be attributed 
to institutions that occasionally offer rates subsidized by the auto-
maker (such as zero-interest-rate deals). When the deals are over, 
these firms return to offering standard rates. For example, Table 
3 contains information about BMW Financeira. It appears that the 
minimum rate and mode practiced in the period was 0%, but in 
this zero-interest-rate scenario, and consequently, zero revenue, it 
is impossible for the financial institution to break even. In reality, 
automakers subsidize the rates to facilitate sales (i.e., the financial 
institution is paid for the sale via a commission from the automaker 
and not through interest revenue).
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Table 3 - Descriptive analysis of the BMW Financeira data
BMW FINANCEIRA S.A. CFI (%)*
Average 1.11
Median 1.14
Mode 0.00
Standard deviation 0.38
Sample variance 0.14
Minimum 0.00
Maximum 1.92
Count 624
Source: Central Bank of Brazil 
* Data in % except for count.
With regard to companies that charge high average rates, the high 
rate variance is attributable to the profile of the customer buying 
the product. The probability of default is an important variable in 
the definition of the interest rate (AFANASIEFF, 2001). Assuming 
that companies should be sustainable and profitable, the interest rate 
charged should be compatible with the customer’s credit risk. Table 
4 presents a descriptive analysis of Omni Financeira. The company 
has a monthly average rate of 3.79% (well over the value observed in 
Table 3 for BMW Financeira), its minimum observed rate is 3.21% 
(in another parallel, this rate is well over the maximum rate charged 
by BMW of 1.92%), and its maximum rate is 5.66%.
Table 4 - Descriptive analysis of Omni Financeira
OMNI S.A. CFI (%)
Average 3.79
Median 3.62
Mode 3.62
Standard deviation 0.51
Sample variance 0.26
Minimum 3.21
Maximum 5.66
Count 624
Source: Central Bank of Brazil 
* Data in %, except for count.
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If we compare the data from automaker banks and high-risk finan-
cers, we can see that there is strong market segmentation, with 
customers of distinct risk profiles buying from specific segments. 
According to Kotler (2000), the division of the market into homo-
geneous groups allows for greater precision in defining market ni-
ches. We define high-risk companies as the financial institutions that 
charge interest rates above one standard deviation of the average rate 
(i.e., companies whose average rates offered for the period was above 
2.24% per month). 
Thus far we have analyzed only the upper and lower sections of 
Figure 5: high risk and automakers. However, as shown in Figure 
2 (data section), the majority of the sales (85% of the loans) were 
made by four firms: BV Financeira, Bradesco, Itaú and Santander. 
Their high market share renders it reasonable to classify these com-
panies as the largest in the segment. This group is crucial to unders-
tand whether they exert some type of influence on other companies 
in the sector, such as a leader-follower game a la Stackelberg.
In summary, we have described thus far three groups with specific 
particularities: financial institutions that are linked to automakers; 
banks that work with customers with high credit risk; and financial 
institutions with large market shares. Finally, other institutions that 
do not have any of the characteristics described above and are not 
significant classic players are classified as “financers”.Finally, the fol-
lowing segmentation of companies is created:
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Table 5 - Segmentation of companies in the market 
Institution Type Institution Type
AYMORE CFI  Financer BCO SANTANDER (BRASIL) S.A.  Large 
BANCO GMAC  Automaker BCO TOYOTA DO BRASIL S.A.  Automaker 
BANCO RODOBENS  Financer BCO VOLKSWAGEN S.A.  Automaker 
BCO BANESTES S.A.  Financer BCO YAMAHA MOTOR S.A.  High-risk 
BCO BGN S.A.  Financer BMW FINANCEIRA S.A. CFI  Automaker 
BCO BRADESCO S.A.  Large BV FINANCEIRA S.A. CFI  Large 
BCO DAYCOVAL S.A.  High-risk CIFRA S.A. CFI  High-risk 
BCO DO BRASIL S.A.  Financer FINAMAX S.A. CFI  High-risk 
BCO DO EST DO RS S.A.  Financer FINANC ALFA S.A. CFI  Financer 
BCO FIAT S.A.  Automaker FINANSINOS S.A. CFI  High-risk 
BCO HONDA S.A.  Automaker 
HSBC BANK BRASIL S.A. BCO 
MULTIP
 Financer 
BCO J SAFRA S.A.  Financer HSBC FINANCE S.A. BM  Financer 
BCO MERCEDES-BENZ S.A.  Automaker ITAÚ UNIBANCO  Large 
BCO PECUNIA S.A.  High-risk MERCANTIL BRASIL FIN S.A. CFIS  Financer 
BCO PSA FINANCE BRASIL S.A.  Automaker OMNI S.A. CFI  High-risk 
PORTOSEG S.A. CFI  Financer 
To evaluate the segmentation adherence, the correlation of the ave-
rage rate variations from each group is compared. Therefore, in the 
case of high-risk financers, for instance, for each observation period, 
the average rate among all companies composing the niche is calcu-
lated. Table 6 presents the results of the above analysis: all groups 
show positive correlations. That is, all segments tend to change 
prices in the same direction. If we observe the correlation of the 
high-risk group with the automaker group, for example, we note a 
correlation of only 0.18, demonstrating the existence of weak or no 
correlation. Another weak correlation is found among the high-risk 
companies and companies from the group of financers (0.34), which 
leads us to the same conclusion. The highest correlation found in the 
table is between the large companies and the financers group (0.52).
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Table 6 - Correlation of variations in interest rates
High-risk Financer Large Automaker
High-risk 1.00
Financer 0.34 1.00
Large 0.47 0.52 1.00
Automaker 0.18 0.29 0.35 1.00
  
Due to their high sales volume, the four companies classified as large 
are analyzed individually to understand the relationship between 
them and previously defined groups. Once the segmentation is de-
fined, the modeling part of the problem begins: reactions to pricing 
changes between the large companies and the other market niches 
are sought. A series of average prices practiced in the period for 
each one of the groups is used (in the case of automaker banks, for 
instance, for each available observation day, the average rate between 
all banks classified as “automaker” is presented in Table 5).
Before applying the model specified in Section 4, it is necessary to 
ensure that the equation to be tested does not have a unit root. To 
that end, the ADF test, which detects the existence of this problem, 
is applied.
As observed in the first column of Table 7, analyzing the data in le-
vels, it is not possible to rule out the presence of unit roots. Hence, 
we estimate the model in differences, which eliminates the problem, 
as observed in the second column of Table 7. The model is fit to the 
following specification:
             (7)
Therefore, the variation of the competitor i price change occurs as 
a function of its own past price variation, competitor and SELIC 
lagged price variation. 
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Table 7 - Statistics of the unit root tests – market segmentation (p-values in 
parentheses)
Em nível Em diferença
-2,470 -14,225
( 0.1234) ( 0.0000)
-3,180 -15,238
( 0.0217) ( 0.0000)
-2,283 -12,612
( 0.1779) ( 0.0000)
-2,210 -1,135
( 0.2031) ( 0.0000)
-2,478 -1,140
( 0.1215) ( 0.0000)
-2,226 -1,062
( 0.1972) ( 0.0000)
-2,389 -1,328
( 0.1453) ( 0.0000)
ADF
Financeira
Montadora
Alto Risco
Bradesco
BV
Itaú
Santander
We estimate a VAR (Vector Autoregressive) model in our problem. 
The VAR  is commonly used in  systems of equations of intercon-
nected time series to analyze random shocks in a dynamic setting. It 
allows for contemporaneous correlation among the disturbances, and 
therefore is preferable to estimating the equations independently. 
The results are shown in Table 8.
We observe in Table 8 the reaction curve estimates for the large 
companies and segments. The columns indicate the segment or com-
pany under analysis, and the rows display the explanatory variables 
for each segment or company. 
We note from the second column of the table that Bradesco Bank 
responds with price changes to the institution’s own past movement. 
The bank also responds with high intensity to price changes by Itaú 
and with lower – but statistically significant – intensity to price 
changes by BV Financeira and the group of financers. Also notewor-
thy is the lack of response by Bradesco with regard to the interest 
rate movement of the high risk and automaker segments.  
We observe that if the coefficient of company j( ) is significant in 
the model of company i, then the price of competitor j affects the 
demand of firm i. Therefore, the demand for Bradesco’s auto finan-
cing is affected by price changes by Itaú, BV and the financers.
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Table 8 - Estimate of model parameters – Response functions
Standard deviation in parentheses ( ) and t-statistic in brackets [ ]. 
Obs.: ***, **, * indicate that the parameter is statistically significant at a confidence level of 
1%, 5% and 10%, respectively.
The largest bank – Itaú, third column -responds positively to its 
own lagged moves, to the price variation of Bradesco and to price 
changes made by financers. These companies, when reducing their 
rates, also reduce the demand for the financing of Itaú, leading the 
bank to optimally reduce its rate. It is interesting to note that Itaú 
does not respond to BV Financeira’s price changes, although the 
latter company is the second-largest institution in financing volume 
(see Figure 2). 
BV Financeira responds more strongly to price changes by Bradesco 
than to its own rate variations. It also responds to price changes 
by Itaú Bank. It is the only company among the large ones that 
does not show a price response to rate adjustments of the finan-
cers. Apparently, the BV Financeira demand is impacted only by 
its two largest competitors: Itaú and Bradesco.Evidence observed 
for Santander Bank show that the financial institution in question 
responds with strong intensity to price changes by Bradesco and 
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also responds to price changes among financers and, surprisingly, 
high-risk financers. Interestingly, there is no evidence that the bank 
significantly responds to price changes by Itaú or BV Financeira or to 
its own historical price changes. Therefore, the Santander demand 
is apparently not directly affected by the price fluctuations of the 
two largest companies of the segment.
Next, the results referring to the average behavior of the segments 
are analyzed – columns 6 to 8. Financers respond to price changes 
by Bradesco and BV Financeira and do not react to their own histo-
rical price changes. This group is the only group among those under 
analysis that responds to the price changes among automaker banks, 
indicating that the automaker banks’ pricing impacts the demand of 
the financers. There is no evidence that the group responds to its 
own outdated price changes, which goes against the initial percep-
tion that these firms are price followers—that is, that they observe 
price changes by leaders and adjust their rates.
While analyzing high-risk companies, we observed that they res-
pond to price changes by Bradesco and BV Financeira, especially to 
those by Bradesco (coefficients of 0.372 and 0.1122, respectively). 
Considering that they serve high-risk customers, firms in this niche 
position their prices at a level higher than those of large companies 
and, as the large ones move, change their prices in response (either 
by increase/cost reduction or through short-term changes). The seg-
ment bases its prices solely on price changes by the large companies, 
not caring about their own prices in previous periods.
Finally, automaker banks respond solely to interest rate changes by 
Bradesco Bank. It is possible that the financing demand of this seg-
ment is linked to other factors, stronger than the price offered by 
the competitors; that is, the automaker banks apparently have inten-
se strategic interactions with the other market segments.
Table 8 presents some noteworthy findings. At the 10% significance 
level, no single group or isolated company responds to changes in 
the SELIC rate. One possible explanation is that changes in the 
SELIC rate are not quickly passed on to the customer. The strong 
impact that the pricing of the large companies generally exerts on 
all the groups is also observed. This evidence may indicate that the 
market works in sequential movements, in which market leaders de-
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fine their price and followers, realizing this movement, adjust their 
offerings. Bradesco exerts a significant effect on the reaction curves 
of all groups and companies, evidencing the strong leadership of this 
institution. In contrast, Santander Bank does not present significant 
coefficients in the reaction curve of any company or bank, revealing 
the company to be a price follower in this market. 
To better illustrate the results, the graphs below show some simula-
tions of price changes and the consequences in the market. Figure 4 
shows the effects in the market of an increase in Bradesco’s rate. In 
the simulation, the price of the institution in question is increased 
by 10%, with its rate shifted from 1.95% per month to 2.15% per 
month. As observed, immediately after the price change, all insti-
tutions and groups begin to reflect this increase in their rates. In 
simulations, we note that an increase of 10% in Bradesco’s price leads 
to a 2.6% increase for Itaú Bank, a 4.5% increase for BV Financeira, 
a 5.6% increase for Santander, a 4.2% increase for automakers, a 
5.2% increase for the high-risk group and a 3.9% increase for the 
financers. 
Following the same reasoning, a price increase of 10% is simulated 
for Itaú. As observed in Figure 5, the increase causes slight increases 
in Bradesco’s price (+2.5%) and in that of BV Financeira (+1.7%). 
Initially, the other institutions present no changes in their pricing. If 
we compare Figures 6 and 7, we note that price changes by Bradesco 
have a greater impact on the market than those by Itaú. 
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Figure 4 - Simulation: Bradesco’s price increases by 10%
 
Figure 5 - Simulation: Itaú’s price increases by 10%.
Finally, network analysis represents a practical and intuitive way to 
analyze the reaction curves. For example, suppose that Firm 1 signi-
ficantly reacts to price changes by Firm 2. In this case, a directional 
arrow is used from Firm 1 to Firm 2, indicating this relationship. 
If both firms react to each other’s price, the arrow is bidirectio-
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nal (Wassernan; Faust, 1994). Figure 6 illustrates this relationship 
between the four large companies and groups in the auto financing 
market (visually, when there is an overlap between arrows, one of 
them is dotted). 
The high-risk group reacts only to movements by Bradesco and BV 
Financeira. The automakers react exclusively to Bradesco’s price 
changes. Itaú reacts to price changes by Bradesco and financers. BV 
Financeira adjusts its pricing based on price changes by Bradesco 
and Itaú. Financers respond to rate adjustments by Bradesco, BV 
Financeira and automaker banks. Finally, Santander changes its pri-
ces when Bradesco, financers and high-risk financers adjust their 
rates. In addition, according to Figure 10, no group reacts to pri-
ce changes by Santander, and all groups react to Bradesco’s price 
changes. 
Figure 6 - Reactions to price changes
Finally, the above data and analyses support the inference that there 
exists evidence that market price changes are largely affected by the 
three largest banks, showing that the large market shares of these 
companies enables them to define what interest rate levels will be 
offered on the market in the short term. We are apparently facing 
a sequential moves market game, with price as a control variable, 
in which the leaders determine their own rate and are followed by 
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the remaining firms. In markets with sequential movement, whose 
prices are primarily set by leaders, the industry reaps greater pro-
fits compared with games with simultaneous moves, such as the 
Bertrand model (see Tirole (1988), for example). 
7. Conclusions
The current study aims to quantitatively evaluate responses to price 
changes in the auto-financing segment with a focus on the short 
term.
Simple data analysis reveals two important facts. First, despite the 
presence of a large number of financial institutions financing auto 
purchase, there exists a strong concentration of sales among four 
institutions: Bradesco, BV Financeira, Itaú and Santander. Second, 
there is substantial heterogeneity in this market related to the rates 
charged and the market share of the firms. These characteristics na-
turally separate firms in four niches: leaders, high-risk, automakers 
and financers. 
We then estimate reaction functions for the market players. The 
objective was to learn how different firms and segments change their 
interest rates in response to price changes made by other firms, 
and to make inference about the competitive environment of this 
market. In conclusion, the majority of the market price changes are 
due to the three largest companies in this sector – Bradesco, BV 
Financeira and Itaú – highlighting the strong influence of Bradesco’s 
pricing policy on the other banks and market segments. This finding 
indicates that the large market shares of these companies enables 
them to substantially influence the market equilibrium, or the inte-
rest rates offered in the market in the short term. 
For example, a 10% increase in Bradesco’s price produces a 2.6% 
increase in Itaú’s rate, a 4.5% increase in BV Financeira’s rate, a 5.6% 
increase in Santander’s rate, a 4.2% increase among the automa-
kers, a 5.2% increase within the high-risk group and a 3.9% increase 
among the financers. 
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There is evidence that the auto financing market is potentially cha-
racterized as a oligopoly playing a leader-follower sequential move 
pricing game. The leading companies set their prices and the others 
adjust their own rates as a function of these changes. This market 
organization results in higher profits for the industry as a whole, 
and enables the leading companies to maintain greater stability and 
assertiveness in their profits.
Therefore, in the retail auto financing industry companies that have 
a larger market share also have more market power and are able to 
influence rates offered to the final consumer. This finding shows 
that actions taken by the leading banks to increase the average rate 
are possible, and thus presents a reason for antitrust policy attention. 
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